






















	STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY	PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC SECTORS	PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL	LEVEL PLAYING FIELD	GEOECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
EU	     	 	 	 	   
NATIONAL					
REGIONAL					



PROMOTE



PARTNER



PROTECT



In force



In development

Size of the symbol is a function of the number of instruments.

# Overview of the Instruments

Strategic autonomy and supply chain security		
<b>Industrial strategy</b>		
Act Support of Ammunition Production	EU	
Connecting Europe Facility	EU	
Digital Europe Programme	EU	
EDIRPA	EU	
European Chips Act	EU	
European Defence Fund	EU	
EU Standardisation Strategy	EU	
Important Projects of Common European Interest	EU	
Defence Research Action	Nat.	
Net-Zero Industry Act	EU	
Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform	EU	
<b>Supply chain security</b>		
REPowerEU	EU	
Critical Raw Materials Act	EU	
Critical Raw Materials Club	EU	
Single Market Emergency Instruments	EU	
New (generation) free trade agreements	EU	
EU-US Critical Minerals Agreement	EU	
<b>Strategic autonomy</b>		
Capital Markets Union	EU	
Blocking Statute	EU	
Anti-Coercion Instrument	EU	
<b>Level playing field</b>		
Anti-subsidy measures	EU	
Foreign Subsidies Regulation	EU	
International Procurement Instrument	EU	
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism	EU	
<b>Legend</b>		
Promote:	Protect:	Partner:
In force	Under development	Under discussion

Protection of critical infrastructure and strategic sectors		
<b>Protection from foreign interference</b>		
5G Toolbox	Nat.	
Banning non-EU foreign controlled entities	Nat.	
Government procurement restrictions	Nat.	
Inbound FDI screening	Nat. + reg.	
Security clearance	Nat.	
“Emergency brake” to protect strategic interests	Reg.	
<b>Resilience</b>		
Critical Entities Resilience Directive	EU	
<b>Cybersecurity</b>		
EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox	EU	
Network and Information Security Directive	EU	
EU Cyber Solidarity Act	EU	
European Cyber Resilience Act	EU	
<b>Data Protection</b>		
General Data Protection Regulation	EU	
<b>Protection of economic and scientific potential</b>		
<b>Technology leakage</b>		
Outbound FDI screening	Nat. + reg.	
<b>Knowledge and technology security</b>		
Toolkit on Tackling Foreign R&I Interference	EU	
EU Hybrid Toolbox	EU	
“Loket kennisveiligheid”	Reg.	
<b>Geoeconomic instruments</b>		
Export credit insurance restrictions	EU	
EU regulation on dual-use export controls	EU	
Unilateral economic sanctions	EU	
Export controls in critical technology areas	EU	
European Peace Facility	EU	
Global Gateway	EU	
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investments	EU/G7	

## Brief Description of the Instruments

### Act in Support of Ammunition Production:

The [Act in Support of Ammunition Production](#) (ASAP) is a financial instrument which entered into force in July 2023. It aims to increase the responsiveness and capacity of the EU defence industry to ensure the timely supply of ammunition and missiles in Europe. It includes a mechanism to anticipate bottlenecks in supply chains and financial support to strengthen the Union's industrial production capacities. The Act is a direct response to the Council's call for urgent deliveries of ammunition and missiles to Ukraine and to help Member States replenish their stocks.

### Anti-coercion instrument:

The [Anti-Coercion Instrument](#) (ACI) is an instrument designed to protect the EU and its Member States against economic coercion by third countries, such as the trade restrictions imposed by China on Lithuania following the announcement of improved trade relations with Taiwan in June 2021. The aim of the ACI is to deter third countries from using or threatening to use measures affecting trade or investment in order to prevent or obtain the cessation, modification or adoption of a specific action by the Union or a Member State. The instrument involves methods ranging from dialogue to, as a last resort, the adoption of countermeasures, including a wide range of trade, investment and financial restrictions.

### Anti-subsidy measures:

The EU's [anti-subsidy measures](#), which are designed to offset distortions in international trade and are also known as countervailing measures, entered into force in June 2016 (last updated in August 2020). These measures can be applied to products that benefit from an unfair subsidy by a trading partner. The EU can impose duties to counteract a subsidy, but only if it is limited to a specific company, industry or group of companies or industries. Measures can take a range of forms, including a 'price undertaking', whereby the exporter agrees to sell the product under investigation above a minimum price. In October 2023, the European Commission formally initiated an [anti-subsidy investigation](#) into the imports of battery electric vehicles (BEV) from China.

### Banning non-EU foreign controlled entities:

Specific clauses in the regulations of EU funding programmes ban non-EU foreign controlled entities. Entities with non-EU direct or indirect shareholders with voting rights above a threshold are banned from participating in all the calls for the European Defence Fund and specific calls for the Connecting

Europe Facility, Digital Europe Programme and Horizon Europe. Under some conditions entities with non-EU shareholders can participate if the national government of the Member State where it is established approves guarantees to confirm the autonomy of the entity.

### **Blocking Statute:**

The [Blocking Statute](#) was originally enacted in 1996 to counteract sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba, Iran and Libya. It aims to protect EU individuals and companies from the extra-territorial application of third country laws. The Blocking Statute nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court decision based on the foreign laws and allows EU individuals and companies to seek redress in court for damages caused by the extra-territorial application of the specified foreign laws. After the US reimposed sanctions on Iran following its withdrawal from the *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* (JCPOA), which permitted trade if Iran curtailed its nuclear programme, the EU updated its Blocking Statute in August 2018 to declare US sanctions on Iran null and void in Europe and prohibit European citizens and companies from complying with them.

### **Capital Markets Union:**

The [Capital Markets Union](#) (CMU) initiative was launched in 2015 and aims to make investments and savings flow across the EU to benefit consumers, investors and companies, regardless of where they are located. The new CMU plan was adopted by the Commission in September 2020 and sets out 16 legislative and non-legislative measures to deliver on three main objectives: supporting a green, digital, inclusive and resilient economic recovery by making finance more accessible to European companies; making the EU an even safer place to save and invest for the long term; and integrating national capital markets into a genuine single market.

### **Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism:**

The European Union's [Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism](#) (CBAM), a carbon tariff on carbon-intensive products imported into the European Union, entered its transitional phase in October 2023. It aims to ensure that the carbon price of imports is equivalent to the carbon price of domestic production and that the EU's climate objectives are not undermined. It applies to imports of certain goods and selected precursors whose production is carbon-intensive and where the risk of carbon leakage is highest: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. In its current transitional phase, the CBAM does not levy a tariff and only imposes reporting obligations.

### **Connecting Europe Facility:**

The [Connecting Europe Facility](#) (CEF) is an EU financial instrument which entered into force in July 2021. It aims to deliver the European Green Deal and to support the development of high-capacity, sustainable, and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the areas of transport (CEF Transport), energy (CEF Energy) and digital services (CEF Digital). In addition to grants, the CEF offers guarantees and project bonds.

### **Critical Entities Resilience Directive :**

The [Critical Entities Resilience Directive](#) (CER), which entered into force in January 2023, is a regulation proposed by the European Commission aimed at strengthening the resilience of critical entities. It establishes a framework to enhance the resilience of critical entities, which are entities providing essential services crucial for the maintenance of vital societal functions, economic activities, public health and safety, and the environment. The Directive covers critical entities in a number of sectors, including energy, transport, health, drinking water, waste water and space. Under the CER, Member States will need to have a national strategy to enhance the resilience of critical entities, carry out a risk assessment at least every four years, and identify the critical entities that provide essential services. Critical entities will need to [identify](#) the relevant risks that may significantly disrupt the provision of essential services, take appropriate measures to ensure their resilience, and report disruptive incidents to the competent authorities.

### **Critical Raw Materials Act:**

The [Critical Raw Materials Act](#) (CRM Act) is a regulation provisionally agreed in November 2023, pending formal adoption by the European Council and the European Parliament. It aims to ensure the EU's access to a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, which are essential for technologies for the green and digital transition, as well as for defence and space. It includes measures to strengthen all stages of the European value chain for critical raw materials, to diversify EU imports to reduce strategic dependencies, and to improve the EU's capacity to monitor and mitigate the risks of disruptions in the supply of critical raw materials. It also includes measures to strengthen international engagement to develop partnerships with third countries.

### **Critical Raw Materials Club:**

The [Critical Raw Materials Club](#) (CRM Club) is part of the EU's efforts to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials for the European industry. It aims to reduce the EU's dependency on single suppliers such as China, and brings together all interested countries that use and produce materials for batteries and green technologies. The goal is that by 2030, with an investment of more than €20 billion in the Club, EU capacity will meet at

least 10% of domestic demand for mining and extraction, at least 40% for processing and refining, and at least 15% for recycling.

### **Defence-related Research Action:**

The [Defence-related Research Action](#) (DEFRA) is a multi-annual scientific programme launched in 2021, financed by the Belgian Ministry of Defence, with an annual call for proposals addressed to Belgian research institutions and industry. It aims to establish R&T partnerships between the Belgian Ministry of Defence, academia, and the industry in a structured manner and according to the triple helix model for innovation. The aim is to bolster the Belgian Defence's military and technological readiness for current and future security challenges.

### **Digital Europe Programme:**

The [Digital Europe Programme](#) (DIGITAL) is an EU funding programme which entered into force in May 2021. It supports projects in five key capacity areas: supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, advanced digital skills, and digital innovation hubs. It pursues the twin objectives of a green transition and digital transformation, while strengthening the Union's resilience and digital sovereignty.

### **“Emergency brake” to protect strategic interests:**

The [“Emergency brake” to safeguard the strategic interests of the Flemish Community and the Flemish Region](#) entered into force in July 2021. It is designed to enable the Flemish Government to annul, suspend or render inapplicable any legal act emanating from a Flemish public authority (with certain exceptions) that gives natural or legal persons not established in a Member State of the European Economic Area control or decision-making power within that public body. The mechanism is to be applied in cases where the strategic interests of the Flemish Community or the Flemish Region are threatened, in particular if the continuity of vital processes is threatened, if certain strategic or sensitive knowledge risks falling into foreign hands, or if the strategic independence of the Flemish Community or the Flemish Region is endangered.

### **EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox:**

The [EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox](#), which entered into force in June 2017, is a framework developed by the European Union (EU) to guide its diplomatic efforts in addressing cyber threats and promoting responsible state behavior in cyberspace. It aims to improve the EU's ability to respond to cyber incidents and promote international stability in the digital domain, as well as to play a role in the calculations of potential aggressors by acting as a deterrent to bad

behaviour in the digital realm. Potential EU diplomatic responses include restrictive measures if deemed necessary and would be proportionate to the scope, scale, duration, intensity, complexity, sophistication and impact of the cyber activity. While the cyber diplomacy toolbox is complementary to actions taken by individual Member States, acting together allows EU Member States to be more credible and send a stronger message.

### **EU Cyber Solidarity Act:**

The [EU Cyber Solidarity Act](#) is a regulation proposed by the European Commission in April 2023 to strengthen the EU's capacities to detect, prepare for, and respond to significant and large-scale cybersecurity threats and attacks. It works by establishing a framework based on three pillars: A European Cyber Shield, which is a platform of national and cross-border Security Operations Centres; A Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism, which supports preparedness, response, and mutual assistance actions among Member States by creating a European cybersecurity reserve of trusted providers; A Cybersecurity Incident Review Mechanism to assess and review significant or large-scale incidents. The Act is currently in the legislative process, pending ratification by the European Parliament and Council.

### **EU Hybrid Toolbox:**

The creation of the [EU Hybrid Toolbox](#) (EUHT), announced in the [Strategic Compass for Security and Defence](#) in March 2022, is a comprehensive framework currently being developed by the European Union to counter hybrid threats and campaigns affecting the EU, its Member States and partners. It aims to gather all civilian and military tools that can be used to counter hybrid campaigns. Hybrid threats refer to a range of manipulative or coercive tactics that remain below the threshold of violence. They include the instrumentalisation of food, irregular migration, energy and lawfare, amongst others.

### **EU regulation on dual-use export controls:**

The [EU regulation on dual-use export controls](#) is governed by Regulation (EU) 2021/82112. It establishes an EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items. It includes common export control rules, a common set of assessment criteria, common types of authorizations, a common EU list of dual-use items regularly updated to reflect changes in technology and international agreements, common provisions for end-use controls on non-listed items, and controls on brokering and technical assistance relating to dual-use items and their transit through the EU.

### **European Chips Act:**

The [European Chips Act](#) (ECA) entered into force in September 2023. It aims to reduce the EU's vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign actors while strengthening the EU's industrial base for chips. By mobilizing more than €43 billion of public and private investment by 2030, it supports large-scale production, innovation, research and skills in the chip industry.

#### **European Cyber Resilience Act:**

The [European Cyber Resilience Act](#) (CRA) is a regulation provisionally agreed in November 2023, pending formal adoption by the European Council and the European Parliament. It aims to strengthen the cybersecurity of digital products by setting a cybersecurity standard and introducing mandatory cybersecurity requirements for all digital products on the EU market, throughout their lifecycle. It also empowers users by requiring manufacturers to provide timely security updates, enabling openness and informed consumer choice. When it enters into force, software and products connected to the Internet would bear the CE mark to indicate that they comply with the new standards.

#### **European Defence Fund:**

The [European Defence Fund](#) (EDF) is an EU financial instrument that was launched in January 2021. It aims to promote cooperation between companies and research actors of all sizes and geographical origins in the Union in the research and development of state-of-the-art and interoperable defence technologies and equipment. The fund seeks to enhance European defense capabilities through collaborative efforts, fostering innovation, and strengthening the Union's strategic autonomy in defense matters.

#### **European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act:**

The [European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act](#) (EDIRPA) is a financial instrument which entered into force in October 2023. It provides a partial reimbursement from the EU budget to Member States for joint purchases involving consortia of at least three Member States. It aims to strengthen European defence industrial capacities by incentivising EU Member States to joint procurement of defence products. The instrument is a response to Member States' request to address the most urgent and critical defence product needs resulting from Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

#### **European Peace Facility:**

The [European Peace Facility](#) (EPF) is an off-budget fund, i.e. financed outside the regular EU budget, established by the EU in March 2021. It enables the



funding of operational endeavors with implications for military or defense within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).. In addition to the provision of training and security infrastructure, it includes all types of military equipment to EU partners. The EPF replaces and enlarges the former financial instruments in this field, namely the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility.

### **EU Standardisation Strategy:**

The [EU Standardisation Strategy](#) is a European Commission proposal, presented in February 2022, to strengthen the EU's global competitiveness, enable a resilient, green, and digital economy, and enshrine democratic values in technology applications. Through the strategy, the Commission has launched a 'standardisation booster' to facilitate a stronger ecosystem between R&I and standards. The strategy also proposes the establishment of a High-Level Forum on European Standardisation to assist in anticipating upcoming standardisation priorities.

### **EU toolbox for 5G security:**

The [EU toolbox for 5G security](#), announced by the European Commission in January 2020, is a set of measures for a coordinated EU approach to secure 5G networks. It is designed to address the security risks associated with the deployment of 5G and includes both strategic and technical measures. Strategic measures include measures related to increased regulatory powers for authorities to scrutinize network procurement and deployment; possible initiatives to promote a sustainable and diverse 5G supply and value chain to avoid systemic, long-term dependency risks. Technical measures include measures to enhance the security of 5G networks and equipment by addressing the risks arising from technologies, processes, human, and physical factors. The toolbox is implemented by Member States with the support of the Commission and the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). In Belgium, the [Royal Decree of 16 April 2023](#) on the deployment of the 5G network, which entrusts the government with the task of setting restrictions on the use of network elements and service providers entered into force in May 2023. The [Royal Decree of 18 April 2023](#) on location requirements for 5G networks will enter into force in January 2028. It imposes geographical rules on mobile network operators concerning network operation centres and security operation centres, which can only operate within the EU.

### **EU-US Critical Minerals Agreement:**

The [EU-US Critical Minerals Agreement](#) (CMA) is an ongoing negotiation between the European Union and the United States to promote EU-US supply chains for critical raw materials needed in the production of electric vehicle batteries. The agreement also aims to mitigate some of the negative effects of

the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on EU industry and should promote high levels of environmental and worker protection in the critical minerals sector and encourage corporate social responsibility across critical minerals supply chains. The Council adopted a decision authorising the Commission to open the negotiations on a CMA in July 2023 and the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the negotiations in September 2023.

### **Export controls in critical technology area:**

In September 2021, the EU has established an [Emerging Technology Expert Group \(ETEG\)](#), drawing on Member States' expertise, to help develop an EU framework to address the risks associated with trade and technology transfer of sensitive emerging technologies. In addition, the European Commission made a [recommendation](#) in October 2023 to conduct a risk assessment of critical technologies for the European Union's economic security in four areas, including semiconductor manufacturing equipment, quantum computing, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies. The aim is to reduce security risks and technology leakage in these technology areas. At a later stage, risk assessments in these four technology areas could lead to restrictive measures such as tighter export controls. It is interesting to note that this first list does not include clean technology, a sector typically considered a priority for de-risking efforts and wherein China holds a worldwide competitive advantage.

### **Export credit insurance restrictions:**

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Credendo, which is a credit insurance group whose sole shareholder is the Belgian State, [decided](#) to withdraw from the Russian market by no longer insuring cross-border transactions with Russia, ceasing to provide any financial assistance to its Russian subsidiary and selling its majority stake (67%) in it. Credendo's mission is to cover the risks faced by exporting companies: it covers the risk in its own name but with the guarantee of the Belgian State, so that if the intensity and duration of the risk exceeds Credendo's capacity, the State covers the risk directly.

### **Foreign Subsidies Regulation:**

The [Foreign Subsidies Regulation](#) (FSR) entered into force in January 2023 and applies since July 2023. It enables the European Commission to tackle distortions caused by non-EU subsidies, including by launching own-initiative investigations, and ensures a level playing field for all companies operating in the Single Market. It applies to subsidies granted by non-EU countries to companies operating in the EU and covers all sectors of the economy, including those of strategic interest to the Union and critical infrastructure. Prior to the adoption of this Regulation, only Member States had to comply with state aid

rules, while third countries did not. In October 2023, the second component of the FSR entered into force: the prior notification requirement for mergers and public procurements above certain thresholds.

### **GDPR:**

The [General Data Protection Regulation](#) (GDPR) entered in force in May 2018, marking a significant milestone in data protection standards. By imposing stringent guidelines, it aims to enhance individuals' control over their personal information and establish a consistent framework for data protection across diverse sectors and geographical boundaries. It requires organizations to protect the personal data and privacy of EU citizens for transactions that occur within EU member states and regulates the export of personal data outside the EU.

### **Global Gateway:**

The [Global Gateway](#) Initiative is an infrastructure initiative launched by the EU in December 2021. It aims to invest €300 billion in global infrastructure development by 2027 by bringing together private and public capital, as well as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It describes itself as based on democratic values and high social and environmental standards, in line with EU values and standards.

### **Government procurement restrictions:**

The Belgian [Circular on "Reducing security risks in public procurement"](#), which entered into force in September 2023, is designed to help contracting authorities manage the risks of espionage and sabotage by foreign powers that may arise in the context of certain public contracts. It requires federal contracting authorities to conduct a 'Quicksan' - a preliminary risk analysis - for all public contracts likely to have an impact on national security. It also requires federal contracting authorities to comply with and use as an interpretative framework a "Toolkit for reducing security risks in public procurement". Under this toolkit, if a public contract falls under the Defence and Security Act of 13 August 2011 and is related to classified information, a specific ground for exclusion applies to companies that are found not to have the reliability required to prevent breaches of State security. If the public contract falls under the ordinary law on public contracts of 17 June 2016, it is also possible to derogate from the procurement rules normally applicable to public contracts, provided that this is necessary in the light of essential security interests and in a proportionate manner.

### **Important Projects of Common European Interest:**

[Important Projects of Common European Interest](#) (IPCEI) is a strategic instrument for the implementation of the European Union Industrial Strategy. It is not a funding program, but a mechanism that allows the European Commission to authorize the public authorities of EU Member States to finance initiatives beyond the limits usually set by European state aid rules. It is designed to stimulate innovation in strategic and emerging industrial sectors through transnational European projects bringing together the public and private sectors. It requires participating economic operators to demonstrate a technological leadership project and a willingness to cooperate with other European innovation leaders in the sector concerned, with the aim of developing the entire value chain in Europe.

### **Inbound FDI screening:**

The Belgian [inbound Foreign Direct Investment screening](#) mechanism entered into force in July

2023. It aims to safeguard Belgium's critical infrastructure and protect sectors crucial to Belgium's national security and strategic interests, as well as to avoid exposing the Belgian economy to geopolitical dependencies that could negatively affect it. The procedure requires non-EU investors to notify and obtain clearance for certain investments in Belgian companies involved in sensitive national sectors, such as critical infrastructure, advanced technology, raw materials, energy and defence. It applies to transactions in which a non-EU investor acquires 'control' over a Belgian strategic entity or acquires voting rights (at least 10% or 25%, depending on the sector) in a Belgian strategic entity.

### **International Procurement Instrument:**

The European Union's [International Procurement Instrument](#) (IPI), which entered into force in August 2022, is a trade instrument designed to provide the EU the necessary negotiating leverage to open up third countries' procurement markets and ensure access and a level playing field for EU companies in those markets. It sets out procedures for the European Commission to investigate alleged measures or practices that negatively affect the access of EU companies, goods and services to non-EU procurement markets and to consult with the non-EU country concerned. The IPI can impose measures to restrict access to EU public procurement for companies, goods and services from the non-EU countries concerned.

### **“Loket kennisveiligheid”:**

In a [joint text](#) published on 25 May 2022, the Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) called on the federal government to set up a national knowledge security desk. Its aim would be to provide universities with strategic information to enable them to decide whether to initiate, continue or interrupt international

cooperation, thus combating the unwanted transfer of knowledge and the covert influence of foreign state actors on teaching and research. It would work by providing an inventory of countries, knowledge institutions, companies and courses that the government considers risky. In February 2023, the Inter-Ministerial Conference on Science Policy (IMCWB/CMPS), composed of members of the various Belgian governments (federal, regional and community), [decided](#) that a proposal for the creation of a national knowledge security desk would be drawn up.

### **Net-Zero Industry Act:**

The [Net-Zero Industry Act](#) (NZIA) is a European Commission proposal, part of the Green Deal Industrial Plan, which aims to create a simpler and more predictable regulatory environment in order to promote the production of clean technologies in the EU. The Act facilitates access to markets by requiring public authorities to consider sustainability and resilience criteria for net-zero technologies in public procurement or auctions, and introduces measures to ensure that there is a skilled workforce to support the production of net-zero technologies in the EU. The goal is for the Union's overall strategic net-zero technologies manufacturing capacity to approach or reach at least 40% of annual deployment needs by 2030. It still needs to be approved by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union before its adoption and entry into force.

### **“New approach” of free trade agreements:**

The European Union's (EU) ["New Approach" to Free Trade Agreements](#) (FTAs) was presented by EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis in June 2022. Innovative features include further strengthening the implementation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters and the use of trade sanctions for violations of core TSD provisions. It also includes enhanced engagement with trading partners to foster compliance with international labour and environmental standards, and to promote the import and export of green goods and services and raw materials, which are particularly important for reducing dependency in the current geopolitical climate. The new approach also makes it easier for civil society and Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) to lodge complaints about violations of sustainability commitments. In June 2022, the EU-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement became the first agreement to be designed with respect to the Commission's new approach. The agreement [will enter into force](#) after both sides confirm that they have completed legal requirements and procedures.

### **NIS2 Directive:**

The [Network and Information Security Directive 2](#) (NIS2) entered into force in January 2023, replacing the previous NIS Directive. It aims to establish a high

common level of cybersecurity across the EU. It introduces stricter requirements for risk management and incident reporting, and covers a wider range of sectors. It also includes more substantial penalties for noncompliance. The Directive applies to a large number of EU organizations and requires them to reassess their cybersecurity posture.

### **Outbound FDI screening:**

The launch of an initiative to address the security risks related to outbound investment was announced in the [European Economic Security Strategy](#) in June 2023. It would aim to protect against the risks of technology and know-how leakage, particularly in the fields of quantum technology, advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence, to destinations of concern that implement civil-military fusion strategies.

### **Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investments:**

The [Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment](#) (PGII) is an infrastructure initiative in which the EU participates and that was launched by G7 leaders at the G7 Summit in Japan in June 2022. It aims to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure development in low- and middle-income countries by bringing together private and public capital, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions. It describes itself as based on gender equality and equity, high social and environmental standards, and promoting transparency, governance and anti-corruption measures.

### **REPowerEU:**

The [REPowerEU](#) plan was launched by the European Commission in May 2022 in response to the disruption of the global energy market caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It aims to help the EU save energy, produce clean energy, and diversify its energy supplies. While diversification is achieved mainly through agreements with other third countries and investment in common purchase of liquefied natural gas, the plan also focuses on increasing gas storage to ensure Europeans have access to affordable energy and includes reaching an agreement to reduce gas demand across the EU. The plan promotes massive investment in the transition to clean energy transition. Through these measures, REPowerEU has succeeded in reducing the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

### **Single Market Emergency Instrument:**

The [Single Market Emergency Instrument](#) (SMEI) aims to establish a comprehensive crisis management framework to identify different threats to the Single Market and coordinate an appropriate response. This instrument seeks to respond to the inadequacy of the current rules and instruments of

the Single Market in crisis situations, as demonstrated by recent events such as the COVID-19 crisis and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Council adopted its negotiating position in June 2023, while the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position in September 2023.

### **Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform:**

The [Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform](#) (STEP) is an European Commission proposal, announced as part of the mid-term reform of the Multiannual Financial Framework in June 2023. It aims to increase, leverage and direct EU funding towards investment in deep and digital, clean and biotechnologies in the EU. It also introduces the Sovereignty Seal - the EU quality label for sovereignty projects, designed to help projects attract public and private investments.

### **Toolkit on Tackling Foreign R&I Interference:**

The [Toolkit on Tackling Foreign R&I Interference](#), published in January 2022, is a publication by the European Commission to help mitigate foreign interference in research and innovation. The toolkit provides a comprehensive strategy to address risks and challenges from abroad. It outlines best practices to help EU higher education institutions and research organisations to safeguard their fundamental values, including academic freedom, integrity and institutional autonomy.

### **Unilateral economic sanctions:**

The European Union (EU) imposes [unilateral economic sanctions](#) as one of its instruments to promote the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EU sanctions regimes may target third country governments or non-state entities and individuals. Measures against individuals and entities consist of asset freezes and travel bans. EU sanctions regimes also include sectoral measures, such as economic and financial measures or arms embargoes.