Launching EMPORIA: Geoeconomics in the Maritime Domain

On a blitz trip to East Asia in early November 2024, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, signed security and defence partnerships with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Expressing a shared concern over mounting international security challenges, the partnerships are meant to strengthen ties between the EU and its Indo-Pacific counterparts across a range of security and defence topics. Topping the list of areas for cooperation between the EU and Japan, and second on the list in the EU-ROK partnership, maritime security appears as a key priority for these actors amid the myriads of security challenges currently encroaching on regional and global stability; and for good reason. 

The maritime domain serves as a cornerstone of today's global economy. Merchant shipping strings together global supply chains by moving vast quantities of goods across continents. At the subsea level, an expansive network of cables and pipelines serves as the backbone of worldwide digital connectivity and energy grids. Generally, as the primary avenue for global economic activity, the ocean is an arena that lends itself very well for geostrategic competition. As actors increasingly seek to leverage economic power to shape geopolitical outcomes, maritime security has been relaunched into the orbit of key challenges faced by states today. This geoeconomic relevance materializes through the weaponization of (in)securities at sea and the consequent urge to construct maritime resilience. The EMPORIA project, conducted at the Royal Military Academy of Belgium, addresses these developments in the maritime domain. The project focusses on the connection between economic nationalism and national maritime strategies and assesses their influence on global power dynamics and the consequent new security challenges for Belgium and the EU.  

The oceans are essential to the global economy, since the international shipping industry is estimated to carry 90% of world trade. In 2023, maritime trade volumes reached 12.292 million tons, with projections indicating further growth of 2% in 2024. Shipping also plays a major role in strategic markets, such as the global energy market. In 2021, energy products transported by tankers and bulk carriers accounted for roughly a third of world seaborne trade. International shipping relies on shipping lanes, also known as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), which have become the lifelines of global trade and are transited by hundreds of ships daily. Ports, meanwhile, serve as economic hubs, driving trade and economic growth at various levels. They are vital economic assets, because they stimulate local job creation, serve as a gateway to the economic hinterland, and are indispensable for global supply chains. Recently, the increased importance of the digital economy has further elevated the ocean’s importance as an avenue of international exchange; submarine communication cables, which transmit 90% of intercontinental data, form the backbone of global hyperconnectivity, linking individuals, corporations and machines. They are indispensable to the current fast-paced international economy, providing stable internet connections which inter alia facilitate cross-continental financial transactions. 

The maritime domain is increasingly exposed to the exploitation of strategic vulnerabilities. Disruptions in international shipping, for example, can have a detrimental economic impact. The 2021 obstruction of the Suez-Canal by the container ship MV Ever Given caused an estimated 10 billion dollars of losses every day due to disrupted trade. While accidents cannot be precluded, the economic importance of maritime chokepoints may also be deliberately exploited. Geopolitical actors increasingly recognize the economic importance of maritime security and seek to project power near SLOCs. For example, since late 2023, Houthi attacks on merchant shipping in the Bab-El-Mandeb strait have forced ships to reroute around Cape of Good Hope, increasing shipping costs and inflating vessel demand. In response, the EU operates naval operations out of Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, to uphold freedom of navigation and protect maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab-El-Mandeb-Strait and Indian Ocean. The possibility to do so is supported by the EU's status as the main donor to Djibouti, which exploits its strategic position to create state revenues. Alongside the EU, other powers have also established a regional military presence to protect their interests. 

Strategically located ports, like SLOCs, can also be leveraged as geoeconomic assets. China, for example, has strategically invested in ports across Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These investments help to secure essential maritime routes, protect Chinese trade flows, and create leverage over beneficiaries of BRI investment. Meanwhile, Indian investments in Iran's Chabahar Port, meant to counter China's prominence in the Indian Ocean region, provide another example. The port enables India to bypass regional rival Pakistan, while strengthening economic ties with landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia.  

Below the surface, too, the world's oceans are rife with geoeconomic competition. Submarine cables, for example, are vital to the global flow of information and finance and, therefore, subject to major strategic interest. The contracts to build and manage these cables are coveted, and currently companies from the U.S., Japan, France and, increasingly, China compete to dominate the circuit. Beyond submarine communication cables, critical maritime infrastructure in general, is susceptible to sabotage and could therefore be incorporated in strategies of hybrid warfare. Recently, for example, Russia's deployment of "ghost ships” near North Sea infrastructure has confronted the littoral states of Europe with the vulnerability of their digital communication networks and energy infrastructure. The unmarked mapping of submarine networks by Russian ships could serve as a blueprint for sabotage, unveiling tactical possibilities for disrupting communication and exploiting weak links in European energy grids. The Russian presence in the North Sea exemplifies the urgency of maintaining oversight over the companies that build and maintain critical submarine infrastructure and protecting it against hybrid threats. States have become increasingly aware of this strategic imperative in recent years. 

The convolution of strategic interests around SLOCs and ports as critical elements of maritime trade represents a broader geoeconomic strategy employed by major powers to secure their economic interests while enhancing both regional and global influence. Control over maritime chokepoints and port investments provides both logistical advantages and leverage over other users of these infrastructures, potentially influencing their foreign and economic policy decisions. Additionally, more covert attempts to exploit dependencies involving equally critical infrastructure on the seafloor add another layer to the complex security matrix of the maritime domain. 

In conclusion, the emphasis on maritime security in the EU’s recent security and defence partnerships with Japan and South Korea, should not come as a surprise. The maritime domain is central to the global economy, but also vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation. Consequently, maritime security is located at the intersection of geopolitics and the economy. As a vital element of global trade, energy markets, and digital connectivity, maritime security can be exploited by actors in a geopolitical zero-sum game. Geopolitical actors seeking relative power gains may try to increase their role in enforcing maritime security in strategic areas or, conversely, threaten that security to exploit the maritime dependency of other actors. In the positive-sum game of the global economy, however, a collective pursuit of maritime security may also lead to mutual gains for multiple actors, especially as reliance on the seas for trade and connectivity continues to grow.  

Because of its dual nature, maritime security becomes a domain for (economic) statecraft, a development which the EMPORIA project aims to shed light on over the next four years. States are aware that the maritime domain offers a range of geoeconomic tools. Power projection near maritime chokepoints, port investments, and surreptitious seafloor mapping exemplify how actors employ maritime strategies to advance their interests. In return, ensuring freedom of navigation, safeguarding critical chokepoints, and securing critical maritime infrastructure have become part and parcel of national security considerations. Altogether, as the central pillar of global trade and connectivity, the maritime domain hosts battles over economic resilience, influence, and power. By extension, maritime security is becoming increasingly intertwined with geoeconomics, and the ocean is set to be one of the main battlefields of great power competition in the foreseeable future.